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ABSTRACT
Model selection is the problem of distinguishing competing models, perhaps featuring differ-
ent numbers of parameters. The statistics literature contains two distinct sets of tools, those
based on information theory such as the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), and those on
Bayesian inference such as the Bayesian evidence and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC).
The Deviance Information Criterion combines ideas from both heritages; it is readily com-
puted from Monte Carlo posterior samples and, unlike the AIC and BIC, allows for parameter
degeneracy. I describe the properties of the information criteria, and as an example compute
them from Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe 3-yr data for several cosmological models.
I find that at present the information theory and Bayesian approaches give significantly different
conclusions from that data.
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1 I N T RO D U C T I O N
Although it has been widely recognized only recently, model selec-
tion problems are ubiquitous in astrophysics and cosmology. While
parameter estimation seeks to determine the values of a parameter
set chosen by hand, model selection seeks to distinguish between
competing choices of parameter set. A considerable body of statis-
tics literature is devoted to model selection [excellent textbook ac-
counts are given by Jeffreys (1961), Burnham & Anderson (2002),
MacKay (2003) and Gregory (2005)] and its use is widespread
throughout many branches of science. For a non-technical overview
of model selection as applied to cosmology, see Liddle, Mukherjee &
Parkinson (2006a), and for an overview of techniques and applica-
tions see Lasenby & Hobson (2006).
In general, a model is a choice of parameters to be varied and a
prior probability distribution on those parameters. The goal of model
selection is to balance the quality of fit to observational data against
the complexity, or predictiveness, of the model achieving that fit.
This tension is achieved through model selection statistics, which
attach a number to each model enabling a rank-ordered list to be
drawn up. Typically, the best model is adopted and used for further
inference, such as permitted parameter ranges, though the statistics
literature has also seen increasing interest in multimodel inference
combining a number of adequate models (e.g. Hoeting et al. 1999;
Burnham & Anderson 2004).
There are two main schools of thought in model selection.
Bayesian inference, particularly as developed by Jeffreys culminat-
ing in his classic textbook (Jeffreys 1961) and by many others since,
can assign probabilities to models as well as to parameter values,
and manipulate these probabilities using rules such as Bayes’ the-
orem. Information-theoretic methods, pioneered by Akaike (1974)
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with his Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), instead focus on the
Kullback–Leibler information entropy (Kullback & Leibler 1951)
as a measure of information lost when a particular model is used
in place of the (unknown) true model. Variants on this latter theme
include the Takeuchi Information Criterion (TIC, Takeuchi 1976),
which extends the AIC by dropping the assumption that the model
set considered includes the true model. Bayesian statistics include
the Bayesian evidence and an approximation to it known as the
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC, Schwarz 1978), which, de-
spite the name, does not have an information-theoretic justification.
Given the plethora of possible statistics, one might despair as to
which to use, especially if they give conflicting results. Cosmolo-
gists, in particular, tend to ally themselves with a Bayesian method-
ology, for example the use of Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
methods to carry out parameter likelihood analyses, and are there-
fore tempted to adopt methods advertised as such. However, even
if one were to side automatically against frequentist approaches,
the situation does not appear that clear-cut; Burnham & Anderson
(2004) have argued that the AIC can be derived in a Bayesian way
(and the BIC in a frequentist one), and that one should not casu-
ally dismiss a criterion soundly grounded in information theory.
Nevertheless, in my view the Bayesian evidence is the preferred
tool; in Bayesian inference it is precisely the quantity which up-
dates the prior model probability to the posterior model probability,
and has an unambiguous interpretation in these probabilistic terms.
The problem with the evidence is the difficulty in calculating it
to the required accuracy, though the situation there has improved
with the development of the nested sampling algorithm (Skilling
2006) and its implementation for cosmology in the CosmoNest
code1 (Mukherjee, Parkinson & Liddle 2006; Parkinson, Mukherjee
& Liddle 2006). This Letter is principally directed at circumstances
1 http://cosmonest.org
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where the evidence is not readily calculable, and a simpler model
selection technique is required.
In this article I describe and apply an additional information cri-
terion, the Deviance Information Criterion (DIC) of Spiegelhalter
et al. (2002, henceforth SBCL02), which combines heritage from
both Bayesian methods and information theory. It has interesting
properties. First, unlike the AIC and BIC it accounts for the sit-
uation, common in astrophysics, where one or more parameters
or combination of parameters is poorly constrained by the data.
Secondly, it is readily calculable from posterior samples, such as
those generated by MCMC methods. It has already been used in
astrophysics to study quasar clustering (Porciani & Norberg 2006).
2 M O D E L S E L E C T I O N S TAT I S T I C S
2.1 Bayesian evidence
The Bayesian evidence, also known as the model likelihood and
sometimes, less accurately, as the marginal likelihood, comes from
a full implementation of Bayesian inference at the model level,
and is the probability of the data given the model. Using Bayes
theorem, it updates the prior model probability to the posterior model
probability. Usually the prior model probabilities are taken as equal,
but quoted results can readily be rescaled to allow for unequal ones if
required (e.g. Lasenby & Hobson 2006). In many circumstances the
evidence can be calculated without simplifying assumptions (though
perhaps with numerical errors). It has now been quite widely applied
in cosmology; see for example Jaffe (1996), Hobson, Bridle & Lahav
(2002), Saini, Weller & Bridle (2004), Trotta (2005), Parkinson et al.
(2006), and Lasenby & Hobson (2006).
The evidence is given by
E ≡
∫
L(θ ) P(θ ) dθ, (1)
where θ is the vector of parameters being varied in the model and
P(θ ) is the properly normalized prior distribution of those parame-
ters (often chosen to be flat). It is the average value of the likelihood
L over the entire model parameter space that was allowed before
the data came in. It rewards a combination of data fit and model
predictiveness. Models which fit the data well and make narrow
predictions are likely to fit well over much of their available pa-
rameter space, giving a high average. Models which fit well for
particular parameter values, but were not very predictive, will fit
poorly in most of their parameter space, driving the average down.
Models which cannot fit the data well will do poorly in any event.
The integral in equation (1) may however be difficult to calculate,
as it may have too many dimensions to be amenable to evaluation
by gridding, and the simplest MCMC methods such as Metropolis–
Hastings produce samples only in the part of parameter space where
the posterior probability is high rather than throughout the prior.
Nevertheless, many methods exist (e.g. Gregory 2005; Trotta 2005),
and the nested sampling algorithm (Skilling 2006) has proven fea-
sible for many cosmology applications (Mukherjee et al. 2006;
Parkinson et al. 2006; Liddle et al. 2006b).
A particular property of the evidence worth noting is that it does
not penalize parameters (or, more generally, degenerate parameter
combinations) which are unconstrained by the data. If the likelihood
is flat or nearly flat in a particular direction, it simply factorizes out
of the evidence integral leaving it unchanged. This is an appealing
property, as it indicates that the model fitting the data is doing so
really by varying fewer parameters than at first seemed to be the
case, and it is the unnecessary parameters that should be discarded,
not the entire model.
2.2 AIC and BIC
Much of the literature, both in astrophysics and elsewhere, seeks a
simpler surrogate for the evidence which still encodes the tension
between fit and model complexity. In Liddle (2004), I described two
such statistics, the AIC and BIC, which have subsequently been quite
widely applied to astrophysics problems. They are relatively simple
to apply because they require only the maximum likelihood achiev-
able within a given model, rather than the likelihood throughout the
parameter space. Of course, such simplification comes at a cost, the
cost being that they are derived using various assumptions, partic-
ularly Gaussianity or near-Gaussianity of the posterior distribution,
that may be poorly respected in real-world situations.
The AIC is defined as
AIC ≡ −2 lnLmax + 2k, (2)
where Lmax is the maximum likelihood achievable by the model
and k the number of parameters of the model (Akaike 1974). The
best model is the one which minimizes the AIC, and there is no
requirement for the models to be nested. The AIC is derived by
an approximate minimization of the Kullback–Leibler informa-
tion entropy, which measures the difference between the true data
distribution and the model distribution. An explanation geared to
astronomers can be found in Takeuchi (2000), while the full statis-
tical justification is given by Burnham & Anderson (2002).
The BIC was introduced by Schwarz (1978), and is defined as
BIC ≡ −2 lnLmax + k ln N , (3)
where N is the number of data points used in the fit. It comes from
approximating the evidence ratios of models, known as the Bayes
factor (Jeffreys 1961; Kass & Raftery 1995). The BIC assumes that
the data points are independent and identically distributed, which
may or may not be valid depending on the data set under considera-
tion (e.g. it is unlikely to be good for cosmic microwave anisotropy
data, but may well be for supernova luminosity–distance data).
Applications of these two criteria have usually shown broad
agreement in the conclusions reached, but occasional differences
in the detailed ranking of models. One should consider the extent to
which the conditions used in the derivation of the criteria are vio-
lated in real situations. A particular case in point is the existence of
parameter degeneracies; inclusion (inadvertent or otherwise) of un-
constrained parameters is penalized by the AIC and BIC, but not by
the evidence. Interpretation of the BIC as an estimator of evidence
differences is therefore suspect in such cases.
Burnham & Anderson (2002, 2004) have stressed the importance
of using a version of the AIC corrected for small sample sizes, AICc.
This is given by (Sugiura 1978)
AICc = AIC + 2k(k + 1)N − k − 1 . (4)
Because the correction term anyway disappears for large sample
sizes, N  k, there is no reason not to use it even in that case, i.e.
it is always preferable to use AICc rather than the original AIC. In
typical small-sample cases, e.g. N/k being only a few, the correction
term strengthens the penalty, bringing the AICc towards the BIC and
potentially mitigating the difference between them.
2.3 DIC
The DIC was introduced by SBCL02. It has already been widely
applied outside of astrophysics. Its starting point is a definition of an
effective number of parameters pD of a model. This quantity, known
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also as the Bayesian complexity, has already been introduced into
astrophysics by Kunz, Trotta & Parkinson (2006), with the focus on
assessing the number of parameters that can be usefully constrained
by a particular data set.
It is defined by
pD = D(θ ) − D( ¯θ ), where D(θ ) = −2 lnL(θ) + C . (5)
Here C is a ‘standardizing’ constant depending only on the data
which will vanish from any derived quantity, and D is the deviance
of the likelihood. The bars indicate averages over the posterior dis-
tribution. In words, then, pD is the mean of the deviance, minus the
deviance of the mean. If we define an effective chi-squared as usual
by χ2 = −2 lnL, we can write
pD = χ 2(θ ) − χ 2( ¯θ ). (6)
Its intent becomes clear from studying a simple one-dimensional
example, in which the likelihood is a Gaussian of zero mean and
width σ , i.e. lnL = A − x2/2σ 2, and where the prior distribution
is flat with width aσ . Care is needed to properly normalize the
posterior, which relates the likelihood amplitude A to the prior width.
In the limit where a  1, so that the posterior is well confined
within the prior, one finds pD = 1 (in this case, the averaging is
just evaluating the variance of the distribution, but in units of that
variance). This corresponds to a well-measured parameter. If instead
a  1, so that the data are unable to constrain the parameter, then
pD → 0 as χ2 becomes independent of x. Hence pD indicates the
number of parameters actually constrained by the data. Extension of
the above argument to an N-dimensional Gaussian, potentially with
covariance, indicates pD = N if all dimensions are well contained
within the prior, and pD < N otherwise (SBCL02; Kunz et al. 2006).
One issue of debate in the statistics literature is the choice of the
mean parameter value in the definition of pD. One could alternatively
argue for the maximum likelihood in its place. This choice affects
the possible reparametrization dependence of the statistic (SBCL02;
Celeux et al. 2006). It may be that the best choice depends on the
situation under study (e.g. the mean parameter value will be a poor
choice if the likelihood has distinct strong peaks).
The DIC is then defined as
DIC ≡ D( ¯θ ) + 2pD = D(θ ) + pD . (7)
The first expression is motivated by the form of the AIC, replacing
the maximum likelihood with the mean parameter likelihood, and
the number of parameters with the effective number. It can therefore
be justified on information/decision theory grounds, as discussed by
SBCL02. The second form is interesting because the mean deviance
can be justified in Bayesian terms, which always deal with model-
averaged quantities rather than maximum values.
The DIC has two attractive properties.
(i) It is determined by quantities readily obtained from Monte
Carlo posterior samples. One simply averages the deviances over the
samples. If the calculation is being performed by whoever generated
the chains, they can obtain the deviance at the mean with a single
extra likelihood call, but even if using chains generated by others,
it should be fine to use the sample closest to that mean value as
the estimator, especially bearing in mind the possibility that the
mode could have been used in place of the mean. The calculation
is also easily performed with posterior samples generated by nested
sampling, which have non-integer weights (Parkinson et al. 2006).
(ii) By using the effective number of parameters, the DIC over-
comes the problem of the AIC and BIC that they do not discount
parameters which are unconstrained by the data.
Note that in the case of well-constrained parameters, the DIC
approaches the AIC and not the BIC, as D( ¯θ ) → −2 lnLmax and
pD → k. It is plausible to believe that it too can be corrected for small
data set sizes using the same formula that leads to AICc, though to
my knowledge there is currently no proof of this.
2.4 Other criteria
In addition to those already mentioned, the literature contains many
other information criteria, but mostly sharing the heritage of those
above. The TIC (Takeuchi 1976) generalizes the AIC by dropping
the assumption that the true model is in the set considered, but in
practice is hard to compute and, where computation has been car-
ried out, tends to give results very similar to the AIC (Burnham &
Anderson 2002, 2004). A Bayesian version of the AIC, the Expected
AIC (EAIC), where one takes its expected value over the posterior
distribution rather than evaluating at the maximum, has been pro-
posed (by Brooks in the comments to SBCL02) but does not appear
to have been significantly applied.
Other information criteria, which appear to have been less
widely used, include the Network Information Criterion (NIC), the
Subspace Information Criterion (SIC, though this abbreviation
is sometimes used for Schwarz Information Criterion as another
name for the BIC), and the Generalized Information Criterion
(GIC). The DIC also comes in many variants, see e.g. Celeux
et al. (2006).
An interesting variant was proposed by Sorkin (1983), using a
Turing machine construction to define an entropy associated with
the theory to be used as a penalty term. This was recently ap-
plied to cosmological data by Magueijo & Sorkin (2007). It has
not been picked up by the statistics community, but may be related
to the widely used minimum message length paradigm (Wallace &
Boulton 1968; Wallace 2005). The idea of interpetting the best
model as the one offering maximal algorithmic compression of
the data goes all the way back to late 17th century writings by
Leibniz.
2.5 Dimensional consistency and model selection philosophy
Dimensional consistency refers to the behaviour of the model se-
lection statistics in the limit of arbitrarily large data sets. The BIC
and evidence are dimensionally consistent, meaning that if one of
the considered models is true, they give 100 per cent support to that
model as the data set becomes large. As a necessary consequence,
however, they will give 100 per cent support to the best model even
if it is not true. By contrast, the AIC is dimensionally inconsistent
(Kashyap 1980), sharing its support around the models even with
infinite data. As the DIC approaches the AIC in the limit of large
data sets, it too is dimensionally inconsistent (SBCL02).
Dimensional consistency does not seem to particularly bother
most statisticians, as they are typically seeking models which can
explain data and have some predictive power, rather than expecting
to represent some underlying truth. Indeed, they commonly quote
statistician George Box: ‘All models are wrong, but some are use-
ful.’ The problem of dimensional consistency is therefore mitigated,
because they do not expect the set of models to remain static as the
data set evolves. Cosmologists, however, are probably not yet will-
ing to concede that they might be looking for something other than
absolute truth specified by a finite number of parameters. Combining
this line of argument with the statements above, this implies that the
Bayesian evidence indeed is the preferred choice for cosmological
model selection when it can be calculated.
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Table 1. Results for comparison of different models to WMAP3 data. The differences are quoted with respect to the first model. Negative is preferred.
Model Parameters k pD −2 lnL( ¯θ ) DIC −2 lnLmax DIC AICc BIC
Base + ASZ 6 5.2 11262.6 11272.9 11262.2 0 0 0
Base + nS 6 6.3 11253.3 11265.9 11252.5 −7.0 −9.7 −9.7
Base + ASZ + nS 7 5.6 11253.0 11264.1 11252.6 −8.8 −7.6 −2.3
Base + ASZ + nS + r 8 5.4 11254.2 11265.0 11252.6 −7.9 −5.6 +5.0
Base + ASZ + nS + running 8 6.2 11250.0 11262.3 11249.0 −10.6 −9.2 +1.4
3 I N F O R M AT I O N C R I T E R I A F O R W M A P 3
I now apply the information criteria to Wilkinson Microwave
Anisotropy Probe 3-yr data (WMAP3) model fits as compiled by
the WMAP team on LAMBDA.2 The DIC calculation is straight-
forward. The eight chains for each cosmology are concatenated, the
mean deviance found by averaging the likelihoods, and the deviance
at the mean estimated by finding the MCMC point located closest
to the mean (where the distance in each parameter direction was
measured in units of the standard deviation of that parameter).
I also quote the values of the differences in AICc and BIC, where
the maximum likelihood is taken directly from the most likely pos-
terior sample (in principle this may slightly disadvantage models
with more parameters, for which the most likely sample will typ-
ically be slightly further from the true maximum, though for the
WMAP3 sample sizes this effect will be small). I take N to be the
number of power spectrum data points, NWMAP3 = 1448 (Spergel
et al. 2006); this choice is to be discussed further below (nothing
changes significantly if a slightly larger number ∼3000 is used to
allow for the pixel-based treatment of the low- likelihood). With
this large value, AIC and AICc are indistinguishable.
The available model fits unfortunately do not quite cover all cases
that might be of interest. All well-fitting models vary five standard
parameters, those being the physical baryon density bh2, the phys-
ical cold dark matter (CDM) density ch2, the sound horizon θ ,
the perturbation amplitude ln (1010 AS), and the optical depth τ
(the Hubble constant and dark energy density are derived parame-
ters). However, no fits are available varying just these parameters, a
Harrison–Zel’dovich model suggested as the best model from first-
year WMAP data in Liddle (2004). (Nevertheless, I will refer to this
as the Base model.) Instead, there are two different six-parameter
models, one adding the spectral index nS and one adding the phe-
nomenological Sunyaev–Zel’dovich (SZ) marginalization parame-
ter ASZ (Spergel et al. 2006). All further available models include
ASZ; extra parameters that I then consider are the spectral index nS
(giving the standard 
CDM model), further addition of tensors r to
give the standard slow-roll inflation model, and inclusion of spectral
index running (without tensors).
The main subtlety is the inclusion of ASZ. This is poorly con-
strained by the data and hence is not expected to contribute fully to
pD; nevertheless the likelihood does have some dependence on it and
it must be included in the analysis that determines the deviance at
the mean. Of the parameters considered, ASZ and τ are phenomeno-
logical parameters which, at least in principle though not yet in
practice, can be determined from the others. The remaining four are
truly independent according to present understanding.
2 Legacy Archive for Microwave Background Data Analysis: http://lambda.
gsfc.nasa.gov. Chains were downloaded in 2006 December. The subsequent
2007 January update does not allow model selection as the chains were not
all generated with the same likelihood code.
The uncertainty in the DIC may not be well estimated by analyz-
ing subsamples, as with smaller samples the mean deviance will be
less well estimated by the nearest point. Instead I estimated the un-
certainty by employing bootstrap resamples of the combined sample
list. This showed that the statistical accuracy was limited by the ac-
curacy with which the lnL values were stored, ±0.1 corresponding
to ±0.2 in the DIC. As this is a much smaller uncertainty than the
level at which differences are significant, the statistical uncertainty
in the determination of the DIC is negligible.
The results are shown in Table 1. The pD values are in good agree-
ment with expectation. Kunz et al. (2006) computed pD for several
models using a compilation of microwave anisotropy data including
WMAP3, and always found pD close to the input number of param-
eters. However, they ran their own chains and did not include the
poorly-constrained parameters ASZ and r. Models including those
parameters return a pD significantly less than k.
While only the Bayesian evidence has the full interpretation as
the model likelihood, leading to the posterior model probability, the
AIC has also been interpreted as a model likelihood by defining
Akaike weights (Akaike 1981; Burnham & Anderson 2004)
wi = exp(−AICc,i/2)∑R
r=1 exp(−AICc,r/2)
, (8)
where there are R models and the differences are with respect to
any one of them. The same interpretation can be given to the DIC
differences (SBCL02). For the BIC, insofar as it well approximates
twice the log of the Bayes factor, it too can be interpreted as a
model likelihood. By convention, significance is then judged on
the Jeffreys’ scale, which rates IC > 5 as ‘strong’ and IC >
10 as ‘decisive’ evidence against the model with higher criterion
value. If the interpretation as model likelihoods holds, these points
correspond to odds ratios of approximately 13 : 1 and 150 : 1 against
the weaker model. As with the evidence, these likelihoods can be
further weighted by a prior model probability if desired.
Recall that the DIC, like the AIC, is motivated from information
theory, while the BIC is not. Indeed, we see that the DIC results quite
closely follow the AIC results; both argue quite strongly against
the Base+ASZ model, but are then rather inconclusive amongst the
remaining models. Thus information theory methods are neither for
nor against the inclusion of extra parameters such as r and running at
this stage. Incidentally, we can also see that if the DIC were defined
using Lmax rather than L( ¯θ ), little difference would have arisen in
this comparison.
The information criteria indicate that WMAP3 has put the
Harrison–Zel’dovich model (with SZ marginalization) under con-
siderable, if not yet conclusive, pressure. This is in accord with the
conclusions reached by Spergel et al. (2006) using chi-squared per
degree of freedom arguments, though the information criterion give
weaker support to this conclusion by recognizing model dimen-
sionality. The strength of conclusion against Harrison–Zel’dovich
could also be weakened by various systematic effects in data anal-
ysis choices, e.g. inclusion of gravitational lensing (Lewis 2006),
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L78 Andrew R. Liddle
beam modelling (Peiris & Easther 2006) and point-source subtrac-
tion (Eriksen et al. 2006; Huffenberger, Eriksen & Hansen 2006).
By contrast, Bayesian approaches do not put nS =1 under any kind
of pressure. Parkinson et al. (2006) found that the full evidences for
the Base model and Base + nS were indistinguishable with WMAP3
alone, and still inconclusive with the inclusion of other data sets.
However, that analysis did not include SZ marginalization, and so
the equivalent comparison cannot be made here. Nevertheless, the
BIC comparison between those models each with ASZ added does
not show any strong preference, and it seems a safe bet that had
the Base model itself been supplied by WMAP3, its BIC difference
compared with Base+nS, the best model in the set as judged by the
BIC, would not have been significant.
Further, while the information theory methods are ambivalent
about r and running, the BIC argues rather strongly against them,
especially in the case of tensors which offer no improvement at all
in data-fitting. Full evidence calculations, however, show that this
conclusion is quite prior dependent (Parkinson et al. 2006).
That the two methods give such different answers is due to the
way that prior assumptions are treated, in particular the prior widths
of the parameter ranges. The AIC does not care about this at all,
and the DIC only cares while the data is weak enough that some
prior information on the parameter distribution remains. By con-
trast, in Bayesian model comparison the prior width is a key con-
cept, determining the predictiveness of the model. For the evidence
this is reflected in the domain of integration over which the likeli-
hood is averaged, while for the BIC it is in the dependence on the
amount of data. Cosmologists are in the fortunate position that for
many parameters the likelihood is highly compressed within reason-
able priors, forcing a discrepancy between information theory and
Bayesian results. This discrepancy will be further enhanced in the
future if the data continue to improve without requiring evolution
in the model data set, i.e. the problem of dimensional inconsistency
of the AIC/DIC may already be with us.
Concerning the inclusion of ASZ in models, it is clear that Bayesian
methods don’t like including it as a fit parameter, as it is poorly
constrained and does not significantly improve the fit. However, the
SZ effect is certainly predicted to be in the data at some level, though
it ought to be derived from the other parameters rather than the fit.
It is tempting to try to deal with this by using pD in the BIC rather
than k, but there is no existing justification for doing so. The same
issue does not arise with the optical depth, also a derived parameter,
as it is well constrained by the data in all models.
In computing the BIC above, I adopted the number of data points
literally. This may not always be the best choice: the derivation of the
BIC requires the data to be independent and identically distributed,
and it may be that this can be better achieved by binning the data
in some suitable way. However, to do so would require a whole
new likelihood analysis for the binned data, counter to the desire
here that the methods should be applicable to pre-existing posterior
samples. In any case there does not appear to be any well-defined
way to judge how much binning, if any, is desirable.
Finally, I note that while here it is the BIC which appears to behave
most like the evidence, in their quasar clustering studies Porciani &
Norberg (2006) found that the DIC was the only criterion to give pre-
cisely the same model ranking order and level of inconclusiveness
as the Bayes factors, with the BIC underfitting.
4 S U M M A RY
I have described several information criteria that can be used for
astrophysical model selection, representing the rival strands of in-
formation theory and Bayesian inference. In application to WMAP3
data, the DIC behaves rather similarly to the AIC, despite the
presence of parameter degeneracies. The conclusions one would
draw from those statistics are rather different from those indi-
cated by Bayesian methods, either the full evidence as computed in
Parkinson et al. (2006) or the BIC as calculated in this article.
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